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THE TESTIMONIAL NATURE OF
MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM INTERVIEWS IN
MASSACHUSETTS: APPLYING CRA WFORD TO

THE CHILD DECLARANT
[T]he confrontation issues posed by statements made by children are
enormously important, complex, and troubling. Sooner or later, the Supreme
Court will have to begin resolving many of these issues.'

INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment embodies the
adversarial system of justice that defines American jurisprudence. 2
Haunted by the injustice suffered by Sir Walter Raleigh, the Framers of the
United States Constitution specifically granted a criminal defendant the
right to confront an adverse witness. 3 The right of confrontation provides
an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine an adverse witness in the
hopes of undermining the witness' testimony or credibility. 4 Those
witnesses who choose to testify against a criminal defendant, thus
jeopardizing the defendant's life and liberty, must do so under the pains
and penalties of perjury, and subject to cross-examination.5
The confrontation right is inextricably intertwined with the
evidentiary Hearsay Rule. 6 The Hearsay Rule states that an out-of-court
statement asserted for the truth of the matter is not admissible except as
I Richard D. Friedman, Further Developments and Thoughts on Child Witnesses, THE
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Oct. 26, 2007, 3:29 PM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/

2007 10 01 archive.html.
2 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) ("The word 'confront,' after all, also
means a clashing of forces or ideas, thus carrying with it the notion of adversariness.").
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-55
(2004) (providing historical underpinnings of Confrontation Clause). The Confrontation Clause
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895) (interpreting Confrontation
Clause as eradicating admission of depositions or ex parte affidavits against criminally accused).
5 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI (requiring in-court testimony of adverse witnesses
ensures sworn statements).
6 See David A. Lowy & Katherine Bowles Dudich, After Crawford: Using the Confrontation
Clause in Massachusetts Courts, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvOC. 1, 2 (2007) (quoting
United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2983 (2006)
("[T]he Confrontation Clause analysis is 'distinct but symbiotic' to the hearsay analysis ....).
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provided by the Rules of Evidence or the Supreme Court, and in
accordance with the Constitution.7 The interplay between the Hearsay Rule
and the confrontation right creates the possibility that hearsay evidence
may be admissible under the Rules of Evidence, yet banned by the
Confrontation Clause, and vice versa.8 Therefore, hearsay exceptions may
permit hearsay to be admitted, even though such admittance violates the
defendant's constitutional rights. 9 To determine whether a hearsay
statement is admissible, a court must first determine whether the evidence
falls within a recognized hearsay exception, and if so, must then determine
whether its admittance is consonant with the Sixth Amendment.'o
Establishing equality between the prosecution and defense in a
criminal trial is essential to the administration of justice. " However, when
an adult defendant is charged with sexually abusing, molesting, or raping a
child, the constitutional safeguards that protect the adult accused from the
child victim may seem unfair, superfluous, or even offensive from societal
and legal viewpoints. 12 The societal interest in such cases is twofold: to
limit the amount of trauma the child victim suffers during the course of the
trial; and, to maximize the amount of available evidence. 3 From a legal
viewpoint, child sexual abuse ("CSA") cases are difficult to prosecute
because there is often a lack of physical evidence or eyewitnesses, and
children may be unavailable to testify. 14 Furthermore, because children

7 See FED. R. EVID. 802; see also infra text accompanying note 50 (articulating Supreme
Court's current standard for hearsay admissibility against criminal defendant).
8 See generally Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay

Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 183-84 & n.13 (1948) (opining hearsay doctrine protects "not
[the] Trier but [the] Adversary").
9 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (conditioning hearsay admissibility on "indicia
of reliability" rather than constitutional mandates); see also infra notes 31-35 (explaining Roberts
reasoning and holding). See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-65 (2004)
(describing inherent dangers of usurping constitutional doctrine with evidentiary rules).
10 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51 (rejecting view that application of Sixth Amendment is
dependent upon evidence law regarding hearsay); see also infra text accompanying note 50
(articulating current standard for hearsay admissibility when Sixth Amendment is also
implicated).
11 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (dictum) (recognizing that justice is
due to the accused and accuser), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2 n.1 (1964).
12 Cf Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990) ("[A] State's interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at
least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court.").
13 See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 547 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1989) (analyzing
"conflicting considerations" regarding hearsay admissibility in child sexual abuse cases).
14 See Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Impact on
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 375-76 (2005) (identifying
difficulties of prosecuting CSA cases based on nature of crime). Sexual abuse often takes place

2011]

CRAWFORD & THE CHILD DECL4RANT

often recant, concerns involving "suggestibility, manipulation, coaching, or
confusing fact with fantasy" lead jurors to view their testimony more
skeptically than that of adults."1
Forensic interviews conducted by multidisciplinary teams
("MDT") assist prosecutors in overcoming these evidentiary hurdles
because, if admitted, these interviews provide the non-testifying child an
opportunity to be heard. 16 An MDT is established to provide a wellcoordinated response to child abuse allegations in a collaborative manner
amongst the various team members, which generally include social
workers, prosecutors, police officers, or mental and medical health
professionals. 17
This coordinated response lessens the number of
interviews a child must sit through in an effort to reduce any additional
trial-related trauma. 18
The MDT approach in conducting forensic
interviews of CSA victims has been extremely successful and "[i]t is now
well accepted that the best response to the challenge of child abuse and
neglect investigations is the formation of an MDT" as evidenced by all
fifty states enacting legislation addressing or promoting the use of
multidisciplinary or multi-agency teams in child abuse cases. 19
Despite the success of MDTs in investigating and prosecuting child
abuse cases, the recent shift in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
announced in Crawfordv. Washington20 has severely limited, if not entirely
banned, the admission of child hearsay statements elicited during forensic
21
interviews.
In Crawford, the Supreme Court articulated a new standard
in secret and there is typically no physical evidence of abuse. See id. at 374-75 (blaming lack of
evidence in cases involving penetration on children's ability to heal quickly).
15 Id. at 375.
Children oftentimes disclose in stages, which increases the risk of
inconsistencies in the child's testimony. See id. (pointing out that children often recant).
16 See generally Jonathan Scher, Note, Out-of-Court Statements by Victims of Child Sexual
Abuse to MultidisciplinaryTeams: A Confrontation ClauseAnalysis, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 167, 16769 (2009) (advocating admission into evidence child statements made during "structured or semistructured forensic interview[s]").
17 See infra Part III.B.2 (explaining MDT approach with focus on Massachusetts).
18 See Raeder, supra note 14, at 381 (discussing benefits of lessening number of interviews
through MDT approach). Reducing the number of interviews may also "lower[] the likelihood
that unnecessarily suggestive questions will be asked." Id.
19 MARK ELLS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

INVESTIGATE CHILD ABUSE

FORMING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY

TEAM TO

4 (2d prtg. 2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/

ojjdp/170020.pdf, see Afultidisciplinary/Aulti-Agency Child Protection Teams Statutes, NAT'L
DIST. ATT'YS ASS'N (last updated May 2010), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Multidisciplinary
%20Multi%20Agency%20Child%20Protection%20Teams.pdf (listing state statutes regarding
formation and authorization of multidisciplinary teams).
20 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
21 See Raeder, supra note 14, at 381-83, 388 ("Crawford' impact cannot be overstated in
cases where children do not testify."); see also Kimberly Y. Chin, Note, "Ainute and Separate":
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for determining the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by
declarants who are unavailable to testify at trial: testimonial hearsay is
inadmissible unless the declarant is available to testify at trial and the
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 22 This standard
has had a particular impact on CSA cases because the child is most often
the only eyewitness, and so it is critical for the prosecution to be able to
introduce the child's testimony, whether in the form of in-court testimony
or hearsay. 23 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's failure to provide a more
comprehensive definition of "testimonial" has led to confusion and
inconsistent judgments in the lower courts regarding the admission of child
victims' statements made during MDT interviews.24 This Note discusses
federal and Massachusetts case law regarding the confrontation right and
its effect on the admissibility of a child victim's statements made during an
MDT interview. 25
More specifically, this Note analyzes possible

Considering the Admissibility of Videotaped Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
After Crawford and Davis, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 88-101 (2010) (discussing Crawford's

effect on child abuse prosecution and suggesting "minute and separate" approach); Allie Phillips,
Child Statements in a Post-Crawford World: What the United States Supreme Court Failed to
Consider with Regard to Child Victims and Witnesses 2 (Berkley Elec. Press, Working Paper No.
1903,
2006),
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle= 9045&context= expresso

(arguing Supreme Court is "sacrificing" child victims through Crawford standard); Scher, supra
note 16, at 172-78 (acknowledging "aftermath" of Crawford and contending statements elicited
during MDT interviews are nontestimonial).
22 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 (conditioning admissibility of testimonial statements
on
declarant's unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-examination).
23 See Prudence Beidler Carr, Comment, Playing by All the Rules: How to Define and
Provide a "Prior Opportunity for Cross-Examination" in Child Sexual Abuse Cases After
Crawford v. Washington, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 631, 631 (2007) (discussing

testimonial standard's negative impact on CSA cases); see also supra notes 14-15 and
accompanying text (highlighting difficulties associated with prosecuting CSA cases).
24 Compare State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 905 (Fla. 2008) (holding CSA victim's
videotaped statements to Child Protection Team testimonial), with State v. Bobadilla, 709
N.W.2d 243, 256 (Minn. 2006) (holding CSA victim's videotaped statements to child protection
social worker nontestimonial). See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial
Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: "'ALittle Child Shall Lead Them, " 82 IND. L.J. 917,

921 (2007) (noting similar results yet varying reasoning amongst lower courts). Mosteller states:
On some of the major issues regarding the practical definition of the testimonial
concept, the lower court cases are much closer to consensus than one might expect,
given their rampant disagreement on the meaning of Crawford in other areas.
However, the lower courts' agreement in terms of result does not extend to doctrinal
justification for some of the results, and the key features that should determine the
testimonial decision in close cases are often unclear.
Id.

25 Compare Parts I-I (discussing case law), with Part V (analyzing testimonial nature of
MDT forensic interviews by applying relevant case law). This Note's analysis is based on the
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classifications of such statements under Crawford's three formulations of
testimonial statements .26
Parts I and II provide a brief history of federal and Massachusetts
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.2 7 Part III discusses the relevant
Massachusetts statutes and case law in determining whether an MDT
forensic interview is testimonial under Crawford.28 Part IV contends that
the Massachusetts child hearsay exception is unconstitutional. 29 Lastly,
Part V analyzes MDT interviews, both procedurally and substantively, to
determine whether they should be admitted against a criminal defendant in
Massachusetts under Crawford and its progeny.30
I. INTERPRETING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In Ohio v. Roberts,3 the Supreme Court established a two-part
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause derived from the two underlying
principles of hearsay evidence: necessity and reliability.3 2 Roberts held

that a hearsay statement made by an unavailable declarant satisfies the
Confrontation Clause "only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability."' 33
Roberts conditioned the reliability of all hearsay evidence-and therefore

Sixth Amendment's confrontation right. Accordingly, the Massachusetts cases discussed in this
Note involve Sixth Amendment claims. In my opinion, my analysis would yield the same result
if analyzed under Article XII because "in cases ... involving the hearsay rule and its exceptions,
[the SJC has] always held that the protection provided by art. 12 is coextensive with the
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Commonwealth v.
DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 221 n.1 (Mass. 2006).
26 See generally infra Part V (suggesting MDT interviews are testimonial under any
formulation).
27 See infra Parts I-II (presenting case law development chronologically).
28 See infa Part III (discussing treatment of potentially involved parties in testimonial
analysis under Massachusetts law).
29 See infra Part IV (contending chapter 233, section 81 of the General Laws of
Massachusetts is unconstitutional).
30 See infra Part V (analyzing MDT interview under Crawford's three testimonial
formulations and "interrogation" definition).
31 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
32 See id. at 65-66 (identifying necessity and reliability as basis of Confrontation Clause). In
applying the rule of necessity, "the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the
unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant" regardless
of whether the out-of-court statement was subject to cross-examination. Id. at 65. The rule of
"reliability" is applicable once the declarant is deemed unavailable, and requires that the hearsay
statement "is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability."' Id. at 66.
33 See id. at 66 (reasoning evidence admissible through hearsay exceptions "comports with.
'substance of the constitutional protection"' (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244
(1895))).
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its admissibility-on whether the hearsay fell within a "firmly rooted
34
hearsay exception" or bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
By defining Confrontation Clause jurisprudence through hearsay
principles, the Roberts test permitted evidence law to control constitutional
doctrine.35
In a radical departure from the Roberts analytical approach, the
Supreme Court, in Crawford v. Washington,36 reinterpreted the
Confrontation Clause based on an analysis of the history of the
confrontation right and its adoption into the U.S. Constitution.3 7 The
recurring theme in the Court's historical analysis was the Framers'
abhorrence of interrogatories and inquisitorial practices used in both the
development of evidence and at trial.38 This theme of abhorrence rested on
two "principal evil[s]" the Framers sought to eradicate from the common
law by cloaking the right of confrontation with constitutionality.3 9
Replacing the two principles of hearsay, the "principal evil[s]" formed the
new pair of lenses for examining the meaning and purpose of the Sixth
Amendment.4 °
The first identified evil concerns the civil law mode of criminal
procedure and its use of ex parte examinations, by deposition or private
judicial examination, as evidence against the accused. 4' Writing for the
Court, Justice Scalia derived two inferences from this evil. 42 First, because
the Framers' concerns involved legal practices that occurred outside the
courtroom, the Court rejected the view that the Confrontation Clause
applied only to in-court testimony. 43 By expanding the breadth of the
Confrontation Clause to out-of-court statements, the Court eradicated any
existing control that the Rules of Evidence had over confrontation issues

34 Id. (inferring constitutional reliability from hearsay rule exceptions); see supra note 33
(providing Court's reasoning).
35 See Crawford v.Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (opining that "vagaries" of evidence
rules were not intended to protect confrontation right); Lowy & Dudich, supra note 6, at 7-8
(attributing Crawford holding to Court's dissatisfaction with Roberts decision).
36 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
37 See id. at 43 (ascertaining meaning of clause from historical background because
Constitutional text alone is insufficient).
38 See id. at 48 (discussing historical context surrounding adoption of confrontation right).
39 See id. at 50 (revealing evidence law's inadequacy in protecting defendant's confrontation
right).
40 See id. at 50-60 (defining two meanings of Sixth Amendment based on historical analysis).
41 See id. at 50-51 (reasoning clause applies to out-of-court statements).
42 See id. at 50-53 (discussing first "principal evil").
43 See id. at 50-51 (expanding clause's reach to out-of-court statements permits constitutional
control over inquisitorial practices).
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and therefore restored each legal source's independence. 44 Recognizing its
limitations, however, Justice Scalia next conceded that the clause is not
applicable to all forms of hearsay. When combined, the two inferences
drawn from this first evil reveal a class of hearsay that is subject to
constitutional analysis, and a class that is not: "testimonial" and
"nontestimonial" hearsay.46
The second "principal evil" acknowledges exceptions, or the lack
thereof, to the constitutional ban of testimonial hearsay.47 Remaining
faithful to his historical analysis, Justice Scalia determined that the Framers
did not intend to recognize an exception, developed by the courts or future
legislation, to the Sixth Amendment. 48 Therefore, only those exceptions
existing at the time of the founding, which were unavailability and a prior
opportunity to cross-examine, are recognized.
Combining these
exceptions with the concept of testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay, the
Court held that testimonial statements are only admissible against a
criminal defendant if the declarant is unavailable to testify and the
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.50
II. ATTEMPTING TO DEFINE TESTIMONIAL
THROUGH FEDERAL & MASSACHUSETTS CASE LAW
A. THE CORE CLASS OF TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS: Crawford v.
Washington
In Crawford v. Washington, the Court concluded that testimonial
statements implicate the Confrontation Clause because such statements
cause the declarant to be a "witness" against the accused within the

44 See Lowy & Dudich, supra note 6, at 7 ("Against [the Roberts] backdrop, the Court
attempted to disentangle the confrontation right from the rule against hearsay and re-infuse the
Confrontation Clause with its original intent .... ).
45 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (distinguishing offhand remarks from statements elicited
though ex parte examination for confrontation purposes).
46 See id. (basing distinction on whether declarant bears testimony against accused). The
Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause "applies to 'witnesses' against the accused in
other words, those who 'bear testimony"' in the form of testimonial statements. Id. Accordingly,
only testimonial statements are subject to a constitutional analysis. Id.
47 See id. at 53-56 (explaining second proposition derived from historical record).
48 Id. at 54 (basing conclusion on historical and textual analysis of Sixth Amendment).
49 See id. (acknowledging unavailability and prior opportunity to cross-examine as
exceptions existing under 1791 common law).
50 Crawford,541 U.S. at 53-54.
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meaning of the Sixth Amendment. 5 ' Classifying a statement as testimonial
is thus the hook upon which a constitutional analysis hangs; without this
classification, the statement's admissibility is primarily governed by the
Rules of Evidence.52
Despite the significant ramifications this
classification implicates, the Crawford Court withheld a comprehensive
definition of the term testimonial.53 Instead, the Court identified three
separate formulations of the term.54
The first formulation the Court acknowledged included "ex parte
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent. ,55 The second formulation
concerned formalized materials typically used at trial.56
The third
formulation provided an objective standard for defining testimonial: if an
objective witness would reasonably believe that her statement would be
available for use at a later trial, then her statement is testimonial.57
51

See id. at 51 (explaining Court's reasoning behind testimonial and nontestimonial

distinction). Defendant Crawford stabbed a man to death who had allegedly tried to rape his
wife, Sylvia Crawford. Id. at 38. At trial, the prosecution played a recorded statement in which
Sylvia described the stabbing. Id. at 38-39 (noting that police recorded Sylvia's statement at
police station). Sylvia was unavailable to testify at trial under the Washington state marital
privilege, and her husband, the defendant, had no prior occasion to cross-examine her. Id. at 3840. Over defense objections, Sylvia's statements were admitted and the defendant was
subsequently convicted of assault. Id. at 40-41. The issue for the Supreme Court was whether
Sylvia's statements were admitted in violation of the defendant's right to confrontation. Id. at 42.
52 Compare supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text (tracing Crawford Court's historical
analysis of confrontation jurisprudence in articulating testimonial and nontestimonial
classifications), with supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (revealing Roberts Court's
reliance on evidence law when admitting hearsay rather than Sixth Amendment). See generally
note 44 and accompanying text (discussing confrontation right's independence from hearsay
rule).
53 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (listing prior testimony and police interrogations as definitive
testimonial statements). Prior testimony includes testimony given at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a previous trial. See id. (reasoning prior testimony and interrogations
are practices most similar to abuses Framers distrusted).
54 See id. at 51-52, 68 (identifying three formulations clause applies to at minimum); Lowy
& Dudich, supra note 6, at 7-8 (summarizing three formulations of term testimonial as outlined in
Crawford).

55 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted) (listing examples of ex parte in-court
testimony or functional equivalent). The Court listed "affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially" as falling into this first
formulation. Id. (citation omitted).
56 Id. at 51-52 (listing "affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions" as testimonial
(quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
57 Id. at 52 (holding that analysis of declarant's objective belief includes analyzing
circumstances under which statement was made). But see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring) (criticizing arbitrariness of Court's third formulation). Chief Justice Rehnquist
named sworn affidavits and depositions as testimonial, and opined that "any classification of
statements as testimonial beyond [sworn statements] will be somewhat arbitrary, merely a proxy
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Unconcerned with articulating a precise definition, the Court suggested that
a "common nucleus" existed among the different formulations and that the
distinctions between them
"define the Clause's coverage at various levels
58
it.",
around
abstraction
of
While it failed to articulate a precise definition of the term
testimonial, the Supreme Court provided some insight, holding that, at a
minimum, statements are testimonial if made at a "preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and [if made during] police
interrogations. 59 Consistently ambiguous, the Court withheld a definition
for the term "interrogation," noting only that the term was to be understood
in its "colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense.", 60 Referring to
examinations by justices of the peace in England, the Court held that the
absence of oath in police interrogations is not dispositive in determining
admissibility. 61 The insignificance of whether statements are given under
oath greatly expands the Confrontation Clause's reach by granting it access
to unsworn, out-of-court statements. 62
B. THE TWO CLASSES OF TESTIMONIAL: Commonwealth v. Gonsalves
Attempting to establish a more precise definition of testimonial, in
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,
the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts ("SJC") identified and defined two classes of testimonial
statements: "per se testimonial" and "testimonial in fact., 64 Per se
testimonial statements are those made in response to questioning by law
enforcement agents, except when the questioning is within the
government's peacekeeping or community caretaking function. 65 The SI
SJC
for what the Framers might have intended had such evidence been liberally admitted as
substantive evidence like it is today." Id. Adhering to the majority's historical approach, Chief
Justice Rehnquist supported his theory by indicating that unsworn testimonial statements and
nontestimonial statements, under common law, were treated similarly. See id.
58 See id.
at 52 (majority opinion) (withholding explanation of shared common nucleus).
59 Id. at 68 (reasoning that these practices are akin to abuses Confrontation Clause seeks to
eradicate).
60 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4 (acknowledging existence of various definitions
of
"interrogation" and failing to select or define them).
61 See id. at 52 (referring to unsworn statements in trial of Sir Walter Raleigh).
62 See id at 50-53 (providing broad definition of testimonial). But cf supra note 57
(presenting Chief Justice Rehnquist's critique of classifying unsworn statements as testimonial).
63 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005).
64 See id. at 552 (defining two classes of testimonial statements).
65 See id. at 555-56 (noting community caretaking exception to per se testimonial
statements); infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (defining community caretaking function
and its relatedness to emergency questioning). The SJC held that in addition to statements
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held that the use of a per se testimonial statement against a criminal
defendant implicates the Confrontation Clause. 66 Statements elicited
through law enforcement interrogations are therefore inadmissible under
Crawford, unless the declarant either testifies at trial or is presently
unavailable, and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.67
Adhering to the term's colloquial sense, the SJC defined
"interrogation" expansively as meaning "all law enforcement questioning
related to the investigation or prosecution of a crime." 68 Such investigative
interrogations may be conducted by "police, prosecutors, or others acting
directly on their behalf",69 Recognizing an exception, the SJC held that
emergency questioning by law enforcement agents does not constitute an
interrogation under Crawford because it arises out of the government's
community caretaking function. 70 As opposed to the investigative purposes
of an interrogation, the purpose of emergency questioning is to secure a
volatile scene or to assess the need for or provide medical assistance.

elicited during police interrogation, a declarant's "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before
a grand jury, or at a former trial" is per se testimonial. See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 554
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)).
66 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 556 (classifying statement as per se testimonial ends
constitutional analysis).
67 See id. at 558-59 (outlining analysis of per se testimonial statements and ramifications
of
such classification).
68 Id. at 561, 555 (citing People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)) (noting
purpose of investigatory interrogations is to preliminarily gather facts and assess probability of
crime).
69 See id. at 555-56 (identifying law enforcement agents for Crawfordpurposes).
70 See id. at 556 ([[E]mergency questioning is] "'totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."' Id.
(quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 764 N.E.2d 841, 844 (Mass. 2002) (quoting Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). "[T]he community caretaking function is implicated if
there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the safety of an individual or the public
is jeopardized." Id. at 556 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brinson, 800
N.E.2d 1032, 1037 (Mass. 2003)) (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 764 N.E.2d 841, 844 (Mass.
2002)); cf Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 694 N.E.2d 341, 343-44 (Mass. 1998) (holding that
caretaking function is implicated only when there is need for immediate assistance).
71 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 556 (relying on colloquial understanding of emergency
questioning in distinguishing it from interrogation). In Massachusetts, an objective standard is
used to determine whether a need to secure a volatile scene exists. See id. at 557. A "volatile
scene" is not restricted to the scene of the initial incident in situations that pose an immediate
danger to the community (e.g., fleeing party is driving under the influence, fleeing person is
armed with intent to execute specific threats, hostage is being held). See id. at 556 n.4
(acknowledging situations where volatile scene expands beyond original scene). However, "the
volatile scene exception to the definition of interrogation does not encompass questioning meant
to apprehend the perpetrator without a more concrete concern of impending harm." Id. In the
absence of such a concern, statements elicited for the apprehension of the perpetrator may be
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Although not testimonial per se, out-of-court statements elicited
through emergency questioning may still be testimonial in fact, and
therefore must be further analyzed to determine whether they are
testimonial in fact. A statement is testimonial in fact if "a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would anticipate [the] statement being
used against the accused" in the investigation and prosecution of a crime. 73
In articulating this standard, the SIC attempted to expand and develop
Crawfordby providing a comprehensive definition of testimonial.7 4
C. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST: Davis v. Washington

As state courts across the country began to develop their own
divergent interpretations of Crawford, the need for a more precise
definition of testimonial was profound.75 In Davis v. Washington,76 the
Supreme Court, in a consolidated opinion authored by Justice Scalia,
77
incrementally spelled out the consequences of Crawford.
Focusing only
on statements made to law enforcement agents, the Court held that the
primary purpose of the interrogationdetermines whether the statements are
testimonial per se. See id. (withholding opinion on categorization of 9-1-1 calls); cf Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828-29 (2006) (concluding 9-1-1 call nontestimonial).
72 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 552, 557-59 (emphasizing constitutional analysis incomplete
after concluding statement nontestimonial per se).
73 Id. at 552, 558 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004))
(adopting Cromer formulation because of its consistency with Crawford and historical purposes
of Confrontation Clause).
The Cromer formulation does not rely on the declarant's knowledge of trial procedure
or the formality of the statement. Rather, it focuses on the declarant's intent by
evaluating the specific circumstances in which the out-of-court statement is made.
Therefore, it is a formulation that would find testimonial all statements the declarant
knew or should have known might be used to investigate or prosecute an accused.
Id. at 558. Providing further instruction, the SJC noted that the judge, in examining the
circumstances under which the statement was made, may consider evidence pertaining to the
purpose for which the statement was made, including the potential for manipulation by the
questioner or declarant. See id. at 558 n.8 (identifying evidence judge may consider in assessing
reasonable person's expectations under like circumstances). Determining whether a statement is
testimonial in fact is a fact-specific inquiry and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
at 557, 559.
74 See id at 552 (noting Supreme Court deferred articulation of comprehensive definition of
testimonial in Crawford).
75 See Lowy & Dudich, supra note 6, at 12-13 (opining need for clarification on key
Confrontation Clause issues cannot be overstated).
76 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
77 See id. at 822 (withholding "exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements
... as
either testimonial or nontestimonial").
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testimonial in nature.78 The primary purpose, in turn, is gleaned from the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation and is dependent upon the
existence or nonexistence of an ongoing emergency.79
Statements are nontestimonial when the interrogation's primary
purpose "is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."8
Applying this reasoning to Davis, the Court held that the victim's
statements made during the course of a 9-1-1 call were nontestimonial. 8'
By contrasting the interrogations in Davis with the one in Crawford, the
Court outlined four factors to consider when classifying statements made
during a police interrogation for Confrontation Clause purposes.82 By
78

See id. at 822 (limiting holding to interrogations because statements at issue are products

of interrogation). Despite its focus on the interrogation's primary purpose, the Court claims that
ultimately, it is the analysis of the declarant's statement itself that determines its testimonial or
nontestimonial nature. See id. ("[I]t
is in the final analysis [of] the declarant's statements, not the
interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate. ").
79 See id. at 822 (identifying two classifications of circumstances and corresponding
implications for characterizing hearsay statements); Lowy & Dudich, supra note 6, at 15 ("Unlike
the reliability focus in Roberts or the testimonial focus in Crawford, the Davis Court shifted the
focus to the emergency or non-emergency nature of the particular situation.").
80Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; cf Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 557 (Mass.
2005) (holding law enforcement agent's emergency questioning does not produce testimonial per
se statements).
81 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 815, 828 (reasoning victim "was not acting as a witness" nor
"testifying"). Davis involved statements made by McCottry, a domestic abuse victim, in response
to a 9-1-1 operator's questions while the defendant was allegedly still inside McCottry's home.
See id.817-18 (transcribing conversation between McCottry and 9-1-1 operator). The Supreme
Court did recognize, however, that some statements made during the course of an interrogation
may be testimonial, while others may not. See id. at 828-29 (believing trial courts will recognize
the point at which statements made during interrogation become testimonial); cf Gonsalves, 833
N.E.2d at 557 (opining that judges are capable of distinguishing community caretaking
questioning from investigative questioning). Thus, if a conversation begins as an interrogation to
determine the need for emergency assistance, and that need is met, statements made after the
emergency has ended would be testimonial. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828-29 (providing emergency
ends when interrogator acquires information needed to address emergency situation). The Court,
in dicta, maintained that the emergency in Davis ended when the defendant drove away from the
premises. See id. (suggesting presence of defendant made situation an emergency). At this point,
the 9-1-1 operator instructed "McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of
questions." Id. (comparing McCottry's statements at this point to the "structured police
questioning" in Crawford). It is worth noting that this distinction was made in dicta because the
Davis Court was asked to classify only McCottry's initial statements. See id. at 829 (referring to
McCottry's statements identifying Davis as her assailant as her initial, nontestimonial
statements).
82 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (comparing circumstances of Davis and Crawford
interrogations to objectively determine their primary purposes). First, the temporal relationship
between when the incident occurred and when the statements were made should be considered.
See id.
(noting McCottry spoke as events "were actually happening"while Crawford spoke hours
after events occurred). Second, the imminence of danger while the declarant is speaking should
be considered. See id. at 827, 832 (referring to statement made in the presence of imminent
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classifying the Davis statements as nontestimonial, the Supreme Court held

that not all statements made to law enforcement agents are testimonial.8 3
However, when the interrogation's primary purpose "is to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution," the
statements are testimonial.8 4 In Hammon, the Court held that the victim's
written statements, contained in an affidavit given to the police, were
testimonial.85 The Court reasoned that the victim's statements were neither
a cry for help, nor did they enable police officers to immediately end a
threatening situation. 6 Though the Davis decision provided some insight
into the nature of statements elicited through law enforcement questioning,
it nevertheless failed to provide a precise definition of "testimonial" and
"interrogation. 87

danger as a "cry for help"). Next, the Court considered the nature of the interrogator's questions.
See id. at 827 (distinguishing questions asked to resolve present emergency from those asked to
learn about past events). Lastly, the Court considered the level of formality of the interrogations.
See id. (viewing circumstances surrounding interrogation as indicative of nature of statements).
The Court viewed Crawford's interrogation, where Crawford responded calmly to a series of
questions with the interrogator taping and making notes of her answers, as more formal; it viewed
McCottry's interrogation, in which McCottry responded frantically over the telephone in an
unstable environment, as more informal. See id. (concluding differences in setting and tone of
declarant's responses indicative of formality degree). But see id. at 830 (basing formality on
degree of resemblance between interrogation and civil-law ex parte examinations). In sum,
Crawford's statements were testimonial while McCottry's statements were not. See id. at 827,
830 (highlighting differences in holdings by outlining four factors in Davis decision).
83 See id. at 822 (indicating circumstances in which police questioning produces
nontestimonial statements); cf Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 556-57 (articulating community
caretaking function that produces nontestimonial statements elicited during law enforcement
interrogation).
84 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
85 See id. at 829 (reasoning that statements were testimonial because primary purpose of
interrogation was to investigate crime). In Hammon, the statements at issue were elicited through
police questioning, conducted in the victim's home. See id. at 830 (noting that interrogation
conducted in separate room without defendant present). "What we called the 'striking
resemblance' of the Crawford statement to civil-law ex parte examinations, is shared by [the
victim's] statement here." Id. at 830 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).
Comparing the facts of Hammon to those of Crawford, the Court noted that both declarants were
actively separated from the defendant. See id. Both statements recounted how alleged past
events began and progressed. See id. (noting statements were deliberately made in response to
police questioning). Also, both statements were made some time after the described incident
ended. See id.; see also supra note 82 (listing temporal relationship as first factor in testimonial
analysis). Elaborating on this temporal factor, the Court pointed out that "[w]hen the officer
questioned Amy ...he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis) 'what is happening,' but rather
'what happened."' Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (indicating primary purpose, if not sole purpose of
interrogation, was ascertainment of possible crime).
86 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 (rejecting argument that statements were nontestimonial
because they were given at alleged crime scene).
87 Cf Lowy & Dudich, supra note 6, at 12-13 (conceding Court "at least" developed
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D. THE CORE CLASS REVISITED: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts," the Supreme Court held that
laboratory test results, contained in certificates of analysis, constitute
testimonial evidence for confrontation purposes.89 The Court reasoned that
certificates of analysis are the equivalent to sworn affidavits and therefore,
under Crawford, fall into the "'core class of testimonial statements.'- 90
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the certificates were "made under

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 9 '
III. DEFINING TESTIMONIAL IN THE CHILD CONTEXT
A. THE CHILD DECLARANT. Commonwealth v. DeOliveira
In Commonwealth v. DeOliveira,92 the SIC faced the issue of
whether a CSA victim's statements to an emergency room pediatrician
were testimonial under Crawford.93
Following Gonsalves' two-part
analytical approach, the court held that the child's statements were not
made in response to police interrogation, and therefore, were not
testimonial per se.94 The court then held that the statements were not

"interrogation" definition).
88 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
89 See id. at 2532 (clarifying earlier holding in Crawford and extending testimonial

classification to laboratory test results).
90 Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52) (concluding certificate of analysis is an affidavit
despite denomination); see supra Part II.A (explaining three formulations of "core class of
'testimonial' statements"). The fact in question was whether the substance Melendez-Diaz had in
possession was cocaine; the test results indicated that the substance was in fact cocaine, and thus
the Court reasoned that the certificates were "functionally identical to live, in-court testimony,
doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination."' Afelendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (2006)) (emphasis omitted in original).
91 Afelendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52) (acknowledging

sole purpose of certificates is to provide prima facie evidence of analyzed substance).
92

849 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006).

93 Id. at 224.
94 See id. at

225 (holding statements nontestimonial per se despite police presence at
hospital). In so holding, the SJC concluded that there was no indication that the doctor acted as a
law enforcement agent. See id. In its legal analysis, the court did not discuss the fact that the
doctor was a mandated reporter under chapter 119, section 51A of the General Laws of
Massachusetts. See DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d at 223, 225 (mentioning mandated reporter status in
fact section only); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2008) (mandated reporter statute).
The doctor testified that the purpose of his examination was to determine whether the child had
been sexually abused or injured, and whether the child was in need of medical treatment.
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testimonial in fact because a reasonable person in the child's position
would not anticipate the prosecutorial use of her statements.95
The SJC conceded that, under Crawford, logic dictates any
statement made by a young declarant to be nontestimonial, unless it was
elicited through police questioning.96 Nevertheless, the SJC did not
interpret Crawford as supporting "a rule of such encompassing latitude"
and therefore declined to adopt the logical conclusion as law. 97 Rather than
adopting a bright-line rule, the SJC understood Crawford to suggest that
statements made by young children may be testimonial. 98 Because of this
possibility, the SJC uses a case-by-case approach in cases involving child
declarants .99
B. THE STATE ACTOR: Departmentof Children and Families & The
MultidisciplinaryTeam
1. Department of Children and Families
The Department of Children and Families ("DCF") is the state
agency responsible for protecting the children of the Commonwealth from
abuse or neglect.100 To assist DCF in locating such children, Massachusetts
law defines certain professionals as mandated reporters, and requires that
DeOliveira,849 N.E.2d at 223. The SJC adopted the doctor's testimony as truth and concluded
that the doctor's role was "entirely independent from law enforcement." Id. at 225. Addressing
the presence of police at the hospital, the SJC concluded that police presence alone cannot turn
questioning by a physician into an interrogation by law enforcement. See id. at 225 (concluding
police not present during physical examination and did not instruct doctor on examination
procedures).
95 See DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d at 226 n.l (correlating age with level of knowledge or
sophistication in determining outcome of "reasonable person" standard); see also Mosteller,
supra note 24, at 953 n.122 (suggesting court's focus would have been different had Davis
standard been applied). The court concluded that the child understood the doctor's questioning to
be for medical purposes only. See DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d at 226 (relying on child's age and
manner in which she answered questions). The court further concluded that there was nothing in
the record to indicate that the child even recognized the criminality of the situation. See id.
(determining testimonial nature of child's statements through case-by-case analysis).
96 DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d at 225.
97 Id. (basing interpretation on level of importance Crawford placed on preserving and

respecting defendant's confrontation right).
98 See id. at 226 n.10 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004))
(discussing tension between Crawford and White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)).
99 Id. at 226 n. 10 (declining adoption of "reasonable child" standard).
100MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 18B, § 3 (2008). More specifically, the Department's primary
duty is to protect children from abuse or neglect inflicted by a parent or parent substitute. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 1 (Supp. 2008).
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these reporters immediately contact DCF if they have reasonable cause to
believe that a child suffers from abuse or neglect.' 0 ' Following this initial
report, a mandated reporter must file, within forty-eight
hours, a written
02
report ("5 IA report") detailing the suspected abuse. 1
Once a 5 IA report is filed, DCF immediately screens the report to
assess whether DCF involvement is warranted, and if so, whether the
situation requires an emergency response as determined by the alleged
situation's severity. 103 If accepted, either a Child Protective Services
("CPS") Investigation or Assessment Response is assigned to the report. 04

101MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A(a) (Supp. 2008) (requiring immediate oral report to

DCF and written report within 48 hours); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 21 (Supp. 2008)
(defining mandated reporters).
102 Ch. 119, § 51A(a); see ch. 119, § 21 (providing and defining "51A report" terminology);
see also ch. 119, § 51A(d) (mandating inclusion of certain information within 51A report). A
mandated reporter may also contact local law enforcement authorities or the Office of the Child
Advocate in addition to filing a report with the Department. Ch. 119, § 51A(a).
103 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.21-4.25 (2009) (outlining screening process and "emergency
report" requirements). DCF involvement is warranted only where there is reasonable cause to
believe that a parent, caretaker, or parent substitute was the perpetrator of the reported child abuse
or neglect. ch. 119, § 1 (stating crucial result of DCF investigation is to either "support" or
"unsupport" 51A report). If a 51A report is supported, Massachusetts law requires the DCF
investigator to provide the child's parent or caretaker with a statement of rights, including: written
notice of the 51 A report; a description of the nature and possible effects of the investigation; and
notice that any information given could be used in subsequent court proceedings. See 110 MASS.
CODE REGS. 4.26(4)(a), 4.27(5) (2009) (requiring statement of rights in emergency and nonemergency responses). See generally Jay McManus, The Reporting and Investigation of
Suspected Abuse and Neglect, in CPCS CHILD WELFARE PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS §§ 2.4,

2.. 1 ("Despite [DCF] regulations, the Parent's Guide does not inform parents that their statements
to the investigator may be used in subsequent court proceedings."). But see Commonwealth v.
Morais, 727 N.E.2d 831, 833-34 (Mass. 2000) (holding non-parent or caretaker defendant not
entitled to statement of rights during DCF interview). Massachusetts law requires DCF to make
specific findings in their investigation of child abuse allegations. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §
51B(b) (Supp. 2008) (requiring inclusion of six factors in DCF conducted investigation). In
conducting their investigation, "[t]he department shall coordinate with other agencies to make all
reasonable efforts to minimize the number of interviews of any potential victim of child abuse or
neglect." ch. 119, § 51B(b); see McManus, supra § 2.4, § 2..2 (explaining DCF joint
investigations with district attorney or law enforcement). DCF, once the investigation and
evaluation of the 51A report is complete, must make a written determination on two issues: the
child's safety and the risk of physical or emotional injury to that child or any other children
residing in the same household; and "whether the suspected child abuse or neglect is
substantiated." ch. 119, § 51B(b). An emergency response is required "[i]f the department has
reasonable cause to believe a child's health or safety is in immediate danger from abuse or
neglect." ch. 119, § 51B(c),(e) (permitting immediate removal of child in emergency situation
and providing response time frame).
104 MASS. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING: A
GUIDE FOR MANDATED REPORTERS,
available at http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/
dss/can mandatedreporters guide.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE] (detailing effects of "screened in"
reports).
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Cases of sexual or serious physical abuse typically receive a CPS
Investigation Response. 105 If, at the end of its investigation, DCF has
reasonable cause to believe that a child has been sexually assaulted, DCF
must notify the appropriate district attorney and law enforcement agency
within five business days. 10 6 If "early evidence" indicates such a belief,
however, DCF must notify the appropriate district attorney and local law07
enforcement immediately, notwithstanding the incomplete investigation. 1
When making a referral, DCF must provide the district attorney and law
enforcement agency with copies of the 5 IA and 5 1B reports.108
2. The Multidisciplinary Team'0 9
When receiving a 5 IA report involving allegations of child sexual
abuse, DCF may choose to collaborate with the district attorney's office in
its 51B investigation of the allegations in an effort to minimize the number
of times the child is interviewed."10 While determining the veracity of the
allegations is always the primary objective, one of the motivating concerns
behind the development of an MDT is reducing the additional trauma and
stress a child may suffer due to repeated investigations."'
In
Massachusetts, multidisciplinary teams are generally coordinated by a
specialized unit within the district attorney's office and may consist of
prosecutors, victim advocates, police, forensic interviewers, DCF social
workers, and mental or medical health professionals.1 2 If available, the

105

Id.

4.51 (2009); see ch. 119, § 51B(k) (outlining procedure for
substantiated 51 A report).
107 ch. 119, § 51B(k).
108 See 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.50-4.52 (outlining procedures for mandatory and
106 110 MASS. CODE REGS.

discretionary referrals to District Attorney and law enforcement).
109 See McManus, supra note 103, §§ 2.4, 2..2 (noting names of joint investigation
teams
vary depending on location).
110 See ch. 119, § 51B(b) (requiring Department to make "all reasonable efforts to minimize"
number of interviews of child victim); ELLS, supra note 19, at 2-4 (listing "less 'system inflicted'
trauma to children and families" as benefit of MDT approach). But see supra notes 106-08 and
accompanying text (discussing mandatory DCF referral to district attorney and law enforcement
under certain circumstances).
ill See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51B(b); ELLS, supra note 19, at 2-4
(promoting MDT approach to minimize additional trauma to CSA victim).
112 See 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.54 (2009) (mandating MDT members); McManus, supra
note 103, §§ 2.4, 2..2 (listing typical makeup of MDT); MASS. CHILDREN'S ALLIANCE,
CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY CENTERS IN MASSACHUSETTS, availableat
http://www.machildrensalliance.org/brochures/MACA English.pdf
[hereinafter
MACA]
(identifying members of multidisciplinary teams). "Members of [an MDT] represent the
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interviews are generally held at a Children's Advocacy Center ("CAC")." 3
CACs provide a safe and child-friendly environment for the
interviewing process." 4 Interviews are conducted by specially trained
forensic interviewers who speak with the child at a level that is appropriate
for the child's intellectual and emotional development; each interview is
customized to meet the child's developmental and psychological needs." 5
While the forensic interviewer is speaking with the child, the remaining
team members may observe the interview through a one-way mirror and
may suggest additional questions. 116
C. THE INVESTIGATOR: Commonwealth v. Howard
In Commonwealth v. Howard,117 the SIC held that a DCF

investigator's interview with a criminal defendant constituted

"the

equivalent of direct police interrogation" and thus implicated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 8
In reaching this
government agencies and private practitioners responsible for investigating crimes against
children and protecting and treating children in a particular community." ELLS, supra note 19, at
2. In Massachusetts, at least one member of an MDT must have "training and experience in the
fields of child welfare or criminal justice." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51D (2008).
113 See ELLS, supra note 19, at 4-5 (recognizing CAC as specialized MDT interview facility).
Massachusetts has a CAC in every county. MACA, supra note 112 (listing each Massachusetts
CAC and providing contact information).
114 See MACA, supra note 112 ("The vision of [the Massachusetts Children Alliance] is to
promote an environment where children are free from . . .abuse and neglect, and where all
children are treated with dignity and respect.").
115 See generally MACA, supra note 112 (ensuring "therapeutically and forensically sound"
evaluations by MDT members).
116 McManus, supra note 103, §§ 2.4, 2..2 (noting observing team members may
suggest
additional questions to interviewer before interview concludes).
117845 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 2006). The defendant was convicted of indecent assault and
battery and of forcibly raping his fourteen-year old niece. Id. at 369. The victim disclosed the
facts of the rape to her mother and a friend on July 14, 2002, approximately eight months after the
incident: they immediately reported the rape to local police. See id.at 369 (noting victim's
delayed admission resulted from shame of "incest baby"). DCF received a 51A report alleging
sexual abuse of the victim by the defendant the following day. Id. at 370. A Sexual Assault
Intervention Network ("SAIN") team interviewed the victim on July 17, 2002. See id. The
interview was conducted in the presence of a DCF investigator, a trooper from the Massachusetts
State police detective unit, and a victim witness advocate from the District Attorney's office. Id.
118 Id. at 372-73; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").

But see

Commonwealth v. Morais, 727 N.E.2d 831, 833-34 (Mass. 2000) (holding DCF worker not
required to provide statement of rights to defendant not in custody). The DCF investigator met
with the defendant on July 30, 2002. Howard, 845 N.E.2d at 370-71. She informed him that she
was part of a joint investigation with the District Attorney's office and that he had the right to
counsel. Id. (noting interviewer asked if defendant wanted counsel present after disclosing that
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conclusion, the SIC held that a DCF investigator is a law enforcement
agent for Sixth Amendment purposes.119 The court noted that whether a

person is a law enforcement agent is a determination made on a case-bycase basis, dependent on the constitutional ramifications
of the specific
20

questioning at issue: there is no set classification. 1

D. THE CHILD HEARSAY EXCEPTION Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 81

(2008)
In addition to the more traditionally recognized hearsay exceptions,

Massachusetts enacted a child hearsay exception under chapter 233, section
81 of the General Laws of Massachusetts. 121 This exception applies in
cases involving the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by CSA
victims under the age often who are unavailable for trial. 122 The proponent
interview was voluntary). The DCF investigator did not, however, inform the defendant that his
words could be used in future court proceedings. Id. Following the interview, the DCF
investigator included the defendant's statements in her 5 1B report and forwarded the report to the
District Attorney's office. Id.; see also supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (discussing
mandatory DCF referrals).
119 See Howard, 845 N.E.2d at 372-73 (overruling trial court's finding).
The court
acknowledged that the DCF investigator's interview with the defendant was held "in furtherance
of her responsibilities for the care and protection of children." Id. Nevertheless, the SJC held
that the interview was "prohibited governmental interrogation." Id. at 373 (defining interview as
"police interrogation" despite investigator's arguably non-prosecutorial primary purpose).
"[[T]he SJC will] not tolerate interrogation practices by government officials or their agents that
will provide the prosecution with the 'equivalent of direct police interrogation.'
Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, 400 (Mass. 2005)) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U.S. 436, 459 (1986)).
120 Id. at 372. The court defined "law enforcement agents" broadly: "persons whose official
duties direct them to interact with a defendant and who may be required to turn any incriminating
response over to the police and prosecutor." Id.
121 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 81 (2008). Prosecutors in a CSA case most often rely on
two hearsay exceptions: excited utterances and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment. See Raeder, supra note 14, at 376 (insinuating that child hearsay exceptions are
unnecessary because of "expansive interpretations" given to traditional exceptions).
122 See ch. 233, § 81(a) (establishing requirements). The statement must describe the alleged
sexual contact, the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident, or must identify the alleged
perpetrator. See id. The statement must concern a material fact and must be "more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence" obtainable "through reasonable efforts."
Id. The testifying witness must have heard the child make the statement notwithstanding to
whom, if anyone, the statement was addressed. Id. Pursuant to subsection (b) and (c) of chapter
223, section 81 of the General Laws of Massachusetts, the judge must find that the child is
unavailable as a witness and that the statement is reliable. Id. There must also be other
independently admitted evidence that corroborates the proffered statement. Commonwealth v.
Colin C., 643 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Mass. 1994) (imposing corroboration requirement in addition to
existing statutory requirements). If all statutory requirements are met, the child's hearsay
statement "shall be admissible as substantive evidence in any criminal proceeding." ch. 233, §
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of such evidence must prove by more than a mere preponderance of
evidence that there is a compelling need for the child's statement.123 If the
child is deemed unavailable for trial, "the statement may be admissible if
imbued with such 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"' that its
admission would not offend the fundamental principles of the confrontation
right. 124 A separate hearing must be held on the record when determining
the reliability of the child's out-of-court statement
and the court must
25
1
findings.
specific
with
conclusion
its
support
To date, the SIC has not determined the constitutionality of the
child hearsay exception. 126 Furthermore, no Massachusetts appellate court
has yet concluded that a hearsay statement introduced under the exception
1
demonstrates sufficient guarantees of reliability to be admissible. 27
81(a).
123

See ch. 233, § 81(b) (requiring proponent to show "diligent and good faith effort" to

produce child and prove unavailability); Colin C., 643 N.E.2d at 25 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 376 (Mass. 1988)) (applying Bergstrom necessity requirement for
admission of videotaped testimony to admission of child hearsay). In Bergstrom, the SJC held
that chapter 278, section 16D of the General Laws of Massachusetts was unconstitutional to the
extent that it violated a defendant's right to confrontation by permitting a child witness to testify
outside the defendant's physical presence. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d at 374-75 (addressing
constitutionality of statute permitting children to testify through electronic means outside of
defendant's presence). The SJC noted that "a compelling need could be shown where, by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the recording of the testimony of a child witness outside the
courtroom.., is shown to be necessary so as to avoid severe and long lasting emotional trauma to
the child." Id. at 376.
124 Colin C., 643 N.E.2d at 24 (quoting Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d at 373) (quoting Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)) (referring to confrontation right under Article 12 of
Massachusetts Constitution). An out-of-court statement is admissible if it was made under oath,
accurately recorded, and the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See ch.
233, § 81(c)(1). If these three conditions are not met, the statement is admissible only if the judge
finds that the "statement was made under circumstances inherently demonstrating a special
guarantee of reliability." ch. 233, § 81(c)(2). The court must, however, consider the following
three factors:
(i) the clarity of the statement, meaning, the child's capacity to observe, remember, and
give expression to that which such child has seen, heard, or experienced; provided,
however, that a finding under this clause shall be supported by expert testimony from a
treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinician; (ii) the time, content and circumstances
of the statement; (iii) the child's sincerity and ability to appreciate the consequences of
such statement.
Id.
125

Ch. 233, § 81(c); Colin C., 643 N.E.2d at 25 (imposing additional requirement of

supporting reliability conclusion with specific findings on record).
126 See Colin C., 643 N.E.2d at 23 (resolving case without ruling on statute's
constitutionality).
127 See, e.g., Colin C., 643 N.E.2d at 23 (reaching conclusion without determining
admissibility of statements under child hearsay exception); Commonwealth v. Baptiste, No. 02-P-

2011]

CRAWFORD & THE CHILD DECL4RANT

Nevertheless, the SIC has not foreclosed the possibility of admitting a CSA
victim's out-of-court statement through the child hearsay exception
because its constitutionality remains intact. 128
IV. THE MASSACHUSETTS CHILD HEARSAY EXCEPTION IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Courts must be cognizant of the inextricable conflict of interests at
play in CSA cases: the societal interest in reducing "trial-related trauma" of
CSA victims and the legal interest in preserving the integrity of our
criminal justice system. 129 A child hearsay exception, however, only favors
the prosecution, leaving the defense to the mercy of testimony he has not,
and cannot, cross-examine. 3 0
More specifically, the exception is
unconstitutional because it tracks the trustworthiness requirements of
Roberts, which were specifically overruled in Crawford, as the standard for
determining hearsay admissibility: without requiring a prior opportunity for
cross-examination, the exception is at odds with Crawford and is therefore
unconstitutional.'13
The confrontation right may yield in limited
circumstances, but it may not yield to the extent that it admits an
unavailable CSA victim's statement, elicited through an MDT interview,
through the Massachusetts child hearsay exception because to do so would
permit the Rules of Evidence to trump constitutional doctrine. 132

1471, 2003 WL 22227763, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 26, 2003) (concluding hearsay
inadmissible based on lack of corroboration and inadequate proof of compelling need);
Commonwealth v. Joubert, 647 N.E.2d 1238, 1241-42 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (concluding hearsay
inadmissible based on lack of corroboration and "substantialindicia of reliability").
128 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting SJC's failure to address exception's
constitutionality).
129 See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 547 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1989) ("[T]he Supreme
Judicial Court often has recognized the tension between these conflicting, and valid, interests.");
see also supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (discussing tension between competing
concerns in CSA cases).
130 See ch. 233, § 81 (failing to condition admissibility on prior opportunity for
crossexamination); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 547 N.E.2d 8, 10-12 (Mass. 1989)
(questioning child hearsay exception's constitutionality under Massachusetts constitution). The
SJC opined that the child hearsay exception contravenes the "face to face" requirement of Article
12 of the Massachusetts Constitution and therefore considered it unnecessary to determine the
constitutionality of the exception under the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 9-12 (reasoning that
Article 12 requirement is stricter than Sixth Amendment).
131 Compare ch. 233, § 81, and supra notes 31-35 (explaining Roberts Court's reliance on
necessity and reliability in determining hearsay admissibility), with supra notes 36-50
(summarizing Crawford Court's historical analysis in departing from Roberts decision).
132 Cf supra note 50 and accompanying text (articulating current
standard for hearsay
admissibility when Sixth Amendment is implicated).
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V. DETERMINING THE TESTIMONIAL NATURE OF
MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM INTERVIEWS UNDER FEDERAL &
MASSACHUSETTS LAW
A. EXPARTE IN-COURT TESTIMONY OR ITS FUNCTIONAL
EQUIVALENT
1. An MDT Interview is the Functional Equivalent of Police
Interrogation
Under federal and Massachusetts law, an MDT interview with a
CSA victim is an interrogation for Confrontation Clause purposes; the SJC,
in accordance with Crawford, defined "interrogation" as meaning "all law
enforcement questioning related to the investigation or prosecution of a
crime" conducted by "police, prosecutors, or others acting directly on their
behalf"' 33 A forensic interviewer's questioning as part of an MDT is
related to the investigation and to the prosecution of the alleged sexual
abuse because the purpose of the interview is to determine whether a crime
was committed: the interviewer preliminarily gathers the facts and assesses
the probability of the crime. 134 The obligatory referral to the appropriate
district attorney's office and police under chapter 119, section 51B(k) of
the General Laws of Massachusetts presupposes that the alleged perpetrator
will be charged with the crime and thus presumes the future involvement of
those two agencies in the investigation and prosecution, respectively, of the
35
alleged crime. 1

133

Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,

833 N.E.2d 549,

555-56

(Mass. 2005)

(defining

"interrogation"); see also supra notes 60, 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing Crawford and
Gonsalves "interrogation" definition).
134 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51B(b) (2008) ("Upon completion of the investigation
and evaluation, the department shall make a written determination relative to: ...(ii) whether the
suspected child abuse or neglect is substantiated."); MACA, supra note 112 (describing forensic
interview as "fact-finding" interview); see also State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 905 (Fla.

2008) ("[T]his kind of interview by a CPT is indistinguishable from an ordinary police
interrogation. Moreover, the primary, if not the sole, purpose of the CPT interview was to
investigate whether the crime of child sexual abuse had occurred, and to establish facts potentially
relevant to a later [trial].") (citations omitted).
135

See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (outlining Massachusetts statutory
An analogous line of argument has been made concerning mandatory

reporting requirements).

reporters. Compare Raeder, supra note 14, at 377 ("[M]andatory reporting arguably makes any
reporter a government proxy, virtually excluding all hearsay of unavailable children. [It is
surprising] that some courts make no mention of these statutes in analyzing whether a child's
statements are testimonial."), with Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 223 (Mass.
2006) (failing to address constitutional implications of doctor's status as mandated reporter).
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Moreover, MDTs generally consist of a forensic interviewer, a
representative from the district attorney's office, and a police officer;
Massachusetts law strongly suggests that an MDT consist of law
enforcement personnel. 3 6 Note that law enforcement MDT members are
not just physically present at the interview, but play an active role in the
interview itself due to their ability to communicate with the interviewer
during the interview. 137 During the interview, the members who are not
physically present in the interviewing room are nevertheless actively
participating in the interview, notwithstanding a one-way mirror, because
of their ability to either directly communicate with the forensic interviewer
before the interview, or electronically communicate, via a headset, during
the interview itself' 38 Thus, the forensic interviewer is merely a proxy for
all interested parties; she is a law enforcement agent under Massachusetts
3 9 To hold otherwise would ignore the constitutional
law. 1'
ramifications of
the questioning, perpetrating the very evil 4the
Confrontation
Clause seeks
0
to eradicate from American jurisprudence. 1
The Crawford Court affirmed that the historical abhorrence of pretrial inquisitorial practices exercised by government officials is the crux of
the constitutional analysis: "The Sixth Amendment must be interpreted
with this focus in mind.' 141 If the Sixth Amendment grants a defendant the
Because DeOliveira was decided prior to Davis, the question remains in Massachusetts as to
whether the mandated reporter requirement will be a persuasive, or even a decisive factor in
determining the police interrogation's primary purpose. See generally Mosteller, supra note 24,
at 953 n. 122 (suggesting DeOliveiraholding would be different had it been decided under Davis).
136 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (identifying MDT members). See generally
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 18C, § 11 (2008) (requiring aligned efforts with law enforcement in
investigation and prosecution of CSA cases); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51D (2008) (listing
"criminal justice" experience as one of two requirements for MDT membership).
137 See McManus, supra note 103, §§ 2.4, 2..2 ("The [MDT members observing the
interview from behind a one-way mirror] may suggest additional lines of questioning to the
interview interview[er]."); see also supra note 94 (discussing SJC approach to police involvement
versus presence in DeOliveira).
138 See McManus, supra note 103, §§ 2.4, 2..2 (noting observing team members may suggest
additional questions to interviewer before interview concludes).
139 Cf Commonwealth v. Howard, 845 N.E.2d 368, 371 (Mass. 2006) (assuming DCF
investigator knew district attorney and police would receive report based on SAIN membership).
140 See id. at 372 (stating SJC's approach in determining whether State actor is law
enforcement agent); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (listing admittance of ex parte
examinations against accused as one "evil" confrontation seeks to quash). In Howard, the SJC
announced that when determining whether a State actor is a law enforcement agent for Sixth
Amendment purposes, the court's "primary concern [is], and remains, with the constitutional
implications of questioning on matters concerning pending charges posed by persons whose
official duties direct them to interact with a defendant and who may be required to turn any
incriminating responses over to the police and prosecutor." 845 N.E.2d at 372.
141Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
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right to have counsel present when being interviewed by a DCF
investigator because of the possibility that the defendant's remarks may
later be used against him in a criminal trial, as was decided in
Commonwealth v. Howard, then the Sixth Amendment should also grant
the defendant the right to confront the accuser about the accuser's
statements to a DCF investigator because of the possibility that those
statements too might be introduced against the defendant. 142 This line of
reasoning conforms with the Constitution because both rights, although
granted in different clauses, ultimately stem from the same source-the
Sixth Amendment-and therefore serve the same purpose: to protect the
criminally accused from ex parte examinations. 143 Accordingly, to hold
that the Sixth Amendment only protects the defendant from his own words,
and not from the words of the accuser-regardless of the accuser's agewould be unconstitutional. 144
2. The Primary Purpose of an MDT Interview is to Create a
Prosecutorial Record
Prior to the Davis Court's declaration of the primary purpose test,
the SIC, in Gonsalves, held that statements elicited through law
enforcement questioning are testimonial per se if the interrogation's
purpose is to gather facts and assess a crime's probability. 145 Though
stated somewhat differently, the Davis primary purpose test parallels the
Gonsalves testimonial per se analysis by classifying statements made
during law enforcement questioning as testimonial if the interrogation's
purpose is to create a prosecutorial record. 146 Recognizing an exception,
both tests classify statements as nontestimonial where the primary purpose
is to assess the need for emergency assistance. 147 If the exception applies,

142

Cf supra notes 117-20 (detailing Howard court's holding and reasoning on issue of DCF

investigator's status).
143 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (protecting rights of criminally accused by requiring presence
of counsel and confrontation).
144 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (contending Howard reasoning should
apply to confrontation cases); see also Mosteller, supra note 24, at 975 ("[C]hildren function as
knowing witnesses who make pointed accusations used in criminal cases in precisely the same
way as do adult witnesses testifying about past facts in the courtroom.").
145 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (explaining Gonsalves testimonial
per se
analysis).
146 See supra text accompanying note 84 (summarizing Davis Court's definition of
testimonial statements).
147 Compare supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing Gonsalves exception),
with supra text accompanying note 80 (discussing Davis exception).
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the statement is nontestimonial under Davis and the constitutional analysis
ends. 148 Under Gonsalves, however, the statement may still be testimonial
in fact. 149 Where the two tests diverge, Davis controls. 150

The primary purpose of an MDT interview is arguably best derived
from analyzing the interviewer's purpose, rather than from the child
declarant's intent or expectations. 151 Focusing on the interviewer's purpose
is the most intelligible approach given the Framers' abhorrence of ex parte
interrogations of witnesses by government officials.152 Accordingly, an
interviewer's purpose for questioning an alleged child victim should dictate
the primary purpose of an MDT interview. 153 Several jurisdictions have
already adopted this line of reasoning when determining whether CSA
54
victims' statements to police officers or MDT members are testimonial. 1
Massachusetts courts should find that statements made by a child
declarant in an MDT interview are testimonial because the purpose of the
government agent's questioning serves an investigatory and prosecutorial
purpose. 155 Stated differently, a forensic interviewer's questions are
148See supra text accompanying note 80 (stating Davis emergency questioning exception).
149See supra text accompanying note 72 (noting Gonsalves two-step testimonial analysis).
150 See Lowy & Dudich, supra note 6, at 16-17 (suggesting Gonsalves testimonial in fact
analysis still controls Article 12 confrontation challenges).
151 See Mosteller, supra note 24, at 970 (hypothesizing that courts were already focusing on
questioner's purpose prior to Davis); cf supra note 95 (discussing Massachusetts' objective child
standard). Mosteller opines that courts are more likely to focus on the questioner's purpose in
child cases for two reasons:
First, a focus on the intent or expectation of the child feels artificial or unknowable.
Second, especially for statements made by small children or to police, a focus on the
child's intent or expectation would give a free pass to government production of
evidence that the Supreme Court has said should receive special scrutiny.
Id.

152See Mosteller, supra note 24, at 984 (contending questioner's purpose determines

testimonial classification in CSA cases); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text
(acknowledging Framers' concerns with civil law mode of criminal procedure).
153See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
child's statements to forensic interviewer at CSA victim center testimonial); State v. Snowden,
867 A.2d 314, 326 (Md. 2005) (holding child's statements to social worker testimonial because
made "in contemplation of later trial"); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 880-81 (Mo. 2006)
(holding CSA victim's statements to sex abuse counselors testimonial based on questioner's
primary purpose); Flores v. State, 120 P.3d 1170, 1178-79 (Nev. 2005) (holding child's
statements to child abuse investigators testimonial based on mandated reporter status); State v.
Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004) (holding child's statements were testimonial because human
services caseworker was proxy for police).
155 See supra note 134 (contending interviewer's purpose is to determine whether crime was
committed). See generally supra Part III.B.2 (providing general overview of MDTs).
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backward-looking: the purpose of questioning an alleged child victim is to
determine whether a crime was committed.156 Considering the third factor
outlined in Davis, the backward-looking nature of MDT questioning
indicates that the primary purpose is to learn about past events, rather than
to meet the needs of an ongoing emergency, and produces testimonial
157
statements.
3. There is No On-Going Emergency Based on a Consideration of
the Davis Factors
The Supreme Court, through its analysis in Davis, outlined four
factors courts should consider when determining whether an interrogation's
primary purpose is to address an "ongoing emergency. ' , 158
As the
Massachusetts community caretaking exception is akin to but less strict
than the Davis exception, the admissibility of CSA victim's statements
159
made during MDT interviews must be analyzed under Davis.
Collectively, consideration of the Davis factors indicates the degree of
formality observed during an interview, which in turn indicates the
existence (or non-existence) of an ongoing emergency: the60more formal the
interview is, the less likely an emergency situation exists. 1
Applying the first factor, the temporal relationship between an
alleged sexual assault and the subsequent MDT interview signals an
emergency's nonexistence because the interview is conducted at some
point after the incident has already ended. 16 1 It is nearly impossible,
however, for a law enforcement agent to elicit statements from a child

156
157

See supra notes 133-34 (highlighting investigatory purposes of MDT interviews).
See infra Part V.A.3 (concluding absence of emergency based on consideration of Davis

factors); see also supra note 82 (listing Davis factors).
158

See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); supra note 82 (outlining four factors

considered in Davis).
159 Compare supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (summarizing federal emergency
questioning exception under Davis), with supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (summarizing
Massachusetts emergency questioning exception under Gonsalves).
160 See supra note 82 (outlining four factors indicative of formal interrogation). The logic
behind the Davis Court's focus on formality is that in an emergency situation, there is no time to
observe formalities. See 547 U.S. at 822.
161 See Mosteller, supra note 24, at 971-72 (passing of time indicates termination of

emergency and "other non-prosecutorial interests"). There is no set time frame when assessing
the temporal relationship. See generally In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(concluding statements elicited during CPS interview approximately five months after alleged
incident testimonial); Rangel v. State, 199 S.W.3d 523, 534-35 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding
statements elicited during CPS interview two months after alleged incident testimonial).
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while the abuse "[was] actually happening., 162 Consequently, the temporal
relationship between the incident and the MDT interview is an
3 The
unpersuasive factor in child abuse cases and is arguably irrelevant. 16
second factor considers whether a child is in imminent danger during an
MDT interview.164 This determination rests upon whether the interview is
conducted in the presence of the alleged perpetrator. 165 Since the alleged
perpetrator is not present at the MDT interview, the child is not in
imminent danger while speaking with the interviewer-analysis
of this
66
1
testimonial.
being
statements
child's
the
to
points
second factor
Viewed objectively, analysis of the first two factors indicates that
the purpose of an MDT interviewer's questioning is not to resolve a present
emergency, but rather to learn about past events. 167 The child declarant, in
response to a structured series of questions posed at some point after the
alleged incident, can recount how past events progressed without the
alleged perpetrator being present. 168 Thus, under Davis' third factor, the
backward-looking nature of an MDT interviewer's
questioning denotes the
69
testimonial nature of the child's statements. 1
However, if early evidence indicates that a child's health or safety
is in immediate danger, then any DCF questioning arguably falls under the
emergency questioning exception because such questioning's primary
purpose, under Massachusetts law, is to assess and determine the child's
safety. 170 Emergency response questioning must be conducted within

162 Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
163 See Anthony J. Franze & Jacob E. Smiles, Still "Left in the Dark": The Confrontation
Clause and Child Abuse Cases After Davis v. Washington, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 33, 34 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105/franze.pdf ("[IT]he
.primarypurpose/ongoing emergency' test appears largely irrelevant to most child abuse cases.").
164 See supra note 82 (discussing second factor in Davis primary purpose test).
165See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828-29 (concluding emergency ended when defendant left
declarant's presence).
166 See id. Compare supra note 112 and accompanying text (failing to list alleged
perpetrator or defense counsel as MDT members), with supra note 116 and accompanying text
(failing to list alleged perpetrator or defense counsel as persons present at MDT interview).
167 See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (displaying MDT interview occurs after
alleged incident outside alleged perpetrator's presence).
168 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (analyzing MDT interview logistics in
acknowledging questioning's investigatory purpose).
169 See supra Part V.A.2 (contending creation of prosecutorial record is MDT questioning's
primary purpose).
170 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51B(c),(e) (2008) (permitting immediate removal of
child and requiring 24-hour response time in emergency situation); see also supra notes 103-08
and accompanying text (discussing D CF investigation process).
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twenty-four hours of DCF receiving the § 5 1A report. 17 1 If interviewed
within this time frame, statements referring to the child's safety may be
nontestimonial and therefore admissible under Davis12 The success of
this argument depends on whether the child has been removed from the
alleged offender's presence or custody because, if removed, then the
child's safety is assumed, and 7therefore
the questioning's purpose is to
3
establish a prosecutorial record. 1
Consideration of an MDT interview's procedural elements under
Davis' fourth and final factor leads to the conclusion that an MDT
interview is best characterized as a formal interrogation. 174 First, a forensic
interviewer, specially trained in communicating with children, conducts the
interview. 175
As some courts have held, the title itself-forensic
interviewer-exposes the relatedness of the interviewer's purpose in
1
eliciting statements and the later use of those statements in court. 76
171

See ch. 119, § 51B(c),(e) (providing emergency response standard and time frame); see

also supra note 103-08 and accompanying text (discussing DCF investigation process).
172 Cf Mosteller, supra note 24, at 971 ("Conversations between a child and a social services
caseworker whose professional interests include the health, physical placement, and safety of the
child are ... problematic, because of the clear overlap with the prosecutorial interest.").
173 See Mosteller, supra note 24, at 971-72 ("[I]f the child has already been removed from
the apparent offender's home, the interview by social services is less likely to primarily concern
placement than prosecution."); supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing effects of
alleged offender's presence during questioning). In Massachusetts, the counterargument to this
line of reasoning in regards to custody is that, under the community caretaking exception, a
"volatile scene" is not restricted to the scene of the initial incident in situations that pose an
immediate danger to the community and therefore the fact that the child has already been
removed from custody (i.e., the volatile scene) is not dispositive. See Commonwealth v.
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 556 (Mass. 2005) (stating community caretaking exception
requirements); see also supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing community
caretaking exception). This counterargument will fail unless the prosecution can establish that a
"concrete concern of impending harm" exists independently from simply the need to apprehend
the alleged offender. See Gonsalves 833 N.E.2d at 556 n.4 (providing case law examples of
situations that pose immediate danger to community).
174 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006) (viewing circumstances surrounding
questioning as indicative of degree of formality); Raeder, supra note 14, at 381-83 (discussing
Crawford ' impact on statements elicited through MDT interviews); see also State v. Hooper, No.
31025, 2006 WL 2328233, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2006) (emphasizing formality of MDT
interview in holding child's statements elicited during interview testimonial).
175 See McManus, supra note 103, at §§ 2.4, 2..2 (naming "interview specialist" as typical
MDT member in Massachusetts); supra note 115 and accompanying text (describing forensic
interviewers' abilities and skills).
176 See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th Cir. 2005) (defining
"forensic" as being "connected with, or [was to be] used in courts of law" (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)); Contreras v. State, 910 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (reiterating
statutory forensic duties of child protection unit members); Hooper, No. 31025, 2006 WL
2328233, *4 n.6 ("'Forensic' means 'of, relating to or denoting the application of scientific
methods and techniques to the investigation of a crime' or 'of or relating to courts of law."'
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Second, an MDT interview consists of a structured series of questioning,
with the interviewer and observing MDT members making notes of the
child's statements. 177 Whether an interview is recorded may influence a
court's determination on the interview's degree of formality. 178 Third, the
interview takes place in a closed environment; separated from the
defendant, the MDT secures the child's safety while simultaneously
conducting an ex parte interrogation of the victim. 179 In conclusion, these
formalities produce statements that are "an obvious substitute for live
testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct
examination; they are inherently testimonial."' 80 Thus, a child's statement
made during such an interview is testimonial and therefore cannot be
introduced against a criminal defendant unless the child is either deemed
unavailable, or the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination. 181

B. OBJECTIVE WITNESS STANDARD
In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court's reliance on the objective
witness' reasonable belief seems to indicate that all three formulations of
1
testimonial statements outlined in Crawford remain applicable. 82
Reconciling Davis with Melendez-Diaz, the primary purpose test is
applicable in cases that involve questioning by law enforcement, or agents
thereof.83 If law enforcement is not involved, then, under Melendez-Diaz

(citation omitted)); State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 564 (N.D. 2006) ("Forensic by definition
means 'suitable to courts."' (citation omitted)).
177 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining how MDT members observe
interview); see also supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing effect of MDT
members' presence at interview on questioning's primary purpose).
178 See Mosteller, supra note 24, at 962-65 (discussing influence of recordation on
determining whether questioning was functional equivalent of police interrogation).
Electronically recording an MDT interview is not required in Massachusetts, but is considered
"good practice." Commonwealth v. Upton U., 795 N.E.2d 575, 578 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
179See supra text accompanying notes 164-66 (discussing alleged perpetrators' absence from
MDT interview and its effect on child's safety).
180 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006); see supra Parts V.A.1-2 (contending
MDT interview is functional equivalent of police interrogation and serves investigatory purpose).
181 See Raeder, supra note 14, at 382 ("[I]t is clear that we must recognize that statements
made to multidisciplinary teams will not be admitted unless the child testifies."); see also cases
cited supra note 154 (holding statements elicited during MDT interviews are testimonial).
182 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (applying all three
formulations).
183 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2 (limiting holding to law enforcement questioning).
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courts may apply an objective witness standard. 18 4 The Massachusetts
standard established in Gonsalves as the testimonial in fact analysis, aligns
with Crawford's third formulation of testimonial statements. 185 Therefore,
if it is determined that an MDT interviewer is not a law enforcement agent
for confrontation purposes, Massachusetts courts may ask whether, under
the circumstances, the reasonable person would understand that her
statements would be available for use in future litigation. 1 6 In cases
involving young children, the SIC has refused to adopt a "reasonable child
standard" because it acknowledges the possibility that children's statements
may be testimonial, and therefore prefers a case-by-case approach in such
187
cases.

The objective witness standard is preferable over the Davis primary
purpose test in situations involving non-law enforcement questioning
because under Davis, courts will be tempted to acknowledge nonprosecutorial purposes, such as protecting the child's health or welfare,
which may lead to an increase in the admittance of child victims'
testimonial statements. 8 8 If the Davis primary purpose test is applied in
184

See Afelendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (applying objective witness standard); People v.

Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 926 n.8 (Colo. 2006) (explaining proper application of objective witness
test).
We emphasize that the objective witness test involves an analysis separate from and in
addition to the police interrogation test. For example, if a child makes a statement to a
government agent as part of a police interrogation, his statement is testimonial
irrespective of the child's expectations regarding whether the statement will be
available for use at a later trial.

Id.
185

Compare supra text accompanying note 57 (articulating Crawford's third testimonial

formulation), and supra text accompanying note 91 (quoting Afelendez-Diaz's use of third
testimonial formulation), with supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining Gonsalves'
testimonial in fact analysis).
186 See Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 225-26 (Mass. 2006) (focusing on
reasonable child's expectations after determining doctor not law enforcement agent).
187 See DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d at 226 n.10 ("[A case-by-case approach] is, in our opinion, a
preferable way to resolve questions raised in the wake of Crawford, at least until the United
States Supreme Court ultimately provides further guidance."); see also supra text accompanying
notes 95-99 (summarizing DeOliveira holding and reasoning). But see Mosteller, supra note 24
at n. 122 (pointing out that DeOliveiraand Davis were decided on same day).
188 See Mosteller, supra note 24, at 972-74 (illustrating this argument by critiquing State
v.
Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006)).
The confrontation right can be diminished to shallow formalism in a critical area if the
health and welfare purpose is recognized as a separate purpose from law enforcement
and if all that is required to make a statement nontestimonial is that the person
conducting the questioning has health and welfare as his or her primary purpose.
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situations where the questioner is not a law enforcement agent, then it
seems as though the purpose of the questioning would ultimately be
determined simply by the interviewer's relationship with the child,
occupation, or membership on a multidisciplinary team, allowing courts to
ignore the objective circumstances surrounding the specific questioning at
issue. 189 Distinguishing between prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial
purposes is particularly difficult in jurisdictions like Massachusetts, "with
coordinated systems for investigating child abuse" because of the
coexistence of prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial purposes of different
team members. 190 Accordingly, prosecutors would argue that statements to
MDT members who, but for their membership on the MDT, are not
affiliated with law enforcement are nontestimonial because they serve a
non-prosecutorial purpose on the team, while the defense bar would argue
that because of their membership on the team, or because of their
mandatory reporter status, they serve a prosecutorial purpose and thus the
child's statements are testimonial. These conflicting arguments present "a
key test of whether the testimonial statement system has substance" or
simply require articulation of some non-investigatory purpose to avoid the
Sixth Amendment. 191
CONCLUSION
Neither the Supreme Court nor the SIC has yet determined whether
a child victim's responses to a forensic interviewer's questioning, as part of
a multidisciplinary team interview, are admissible in a criminal trial where
the child does not testify. Until this issue is resolved, Massachusetts
prosecutors must acknowledge Crawford's impact on CSA cases and admit
that the MDT approach, while crucial to the investigation and prosecution
of sexual crimes committed against children, creates testimonial
statements. Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, the SIC
should follow a strict, formalistic application of Crawford to CSA cases
and find child hearsay statements procured through multidisciplinary
forensic interviews inadmissible because of the defendant's Sixth

Id. at 973.
189

See id. at 970 ("[A] child may make a clearly accusatory statement and fully understand

its impact, but courts can ignore contrary indicators if the child makes the statement to a parent or
doctor with a primary purpose other than criminal prosecution.").
190 See id. at 970-75 (articulating mixed-purpose category of statements and suggesting noncategorical limitations on such statements).
191 See id. at 974 (opining articulation of non-investigatory purpose of MDT interview is "an
avoidance strategy").
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Amendment right of confrontation. Notwithstanding the societal interest in
protecting CSA victims and ensuring that "pernicious malefactors may be
brought to justice," the SJC must maintain our criminal justice system's
credibility by acknowledging the fundamental principles of fairness upon
which it was founded; it must not permit competing societal interests to
supplant a criminally accused's constitutional rights. 192 Though difficult to
accept, given the heinousness of the crime, children are "witnesses against
the accused" under the Sixth Amendment.
Laura E. Ruzzo

192

Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 547 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1989).

